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LAW REVIEW1987 
INTRODUCTION TO "THE SILENT WORLD OF 
DOCTOR AND PATIENT" 
ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON· 
I never cease being amazed how early reticence and evasion ap­
pear in physicians-to-be. In the first session of the "Medicine I Ethics 
Conference" taken by all third-year medical students at the University 
of Southern California, my two colleagues from medicine and ethics 
and I sometimes ask the students to tell us how they will introduce 
themselves to the patients for whom they will be caring during their 
six-week rotation through the Student Ward at LA County/USC Hos­
pital. "As part of the medical team," say some, while more reply, 
"As Doctor So-and-So." A few suggest "student-physician," but 
others report feeling more comfortable with "medical student." The 
point of the class session is not to insist that they all adopt a particular 
term. Rather, we hope that they will recognize what might seem a 
minor matter as something of considerable importance: their first con­
tact with a patient in which the foundation for the relationship is set, 
and an early test of their commitment to candor in that relationship. 
Why, we ask the students who introduce themselves as "Doctor" 
or try to give that impression, is that term appropriate? Because they 
are going to touch the patients, to probe them physically and verbally, 
these students reply. Patients would accept such intimacies only from 
a physician. How do they know that, I wonder? Is this decision a 
reflection of how they will behave during the coming years as practi­
tioners? Will they act like scientists and test their assumptions about 
patients' reactions, or will they enshrine their own reactions and fears, 
* Topping Professor of Law, Medicine and Public Policy, University of Southern 
California; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1966; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1969. 
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along with the "received wisdom" of their peers and predecessors, as 
truths that do not need to be examined? ("Never tell patients they 
have cancer-they don't want to know and they'll give up hope and 
kill themselves if you do!"!) 
Moreover, I inquire, what-besides a misrepresentation of their 
stage of education-are the students telling patients when they use the 
term "Doctor"? That they want a certain level of deference? That 
being "Doctor" will explain why they employ strange, Latinate words 
that the patients find difficult to understand? What different sort of 
message would be given if the term "student-physician" were used? 
Would that signify that the person bearing such a title is asking the 
patient for permission to learn by practicing (in the ordinary meaning 
of that word) with the patient? Such an implicit request clearly makes 
some students uncomfortable. Why? Because a patient might say 
"No, thank you, I want someone else"? Or even because it would alter 
the usual balance of power and authority and make the patient the 
teacher of the medical student, or, at the very least, make the two 
collaborators? 
Of course, my questions tend to be especially pointed for this first 
group of students. But I also am fascinated to hear the rationales 
given by those who want to avoid any use of the word "physician" in 
explaining themselves to patients, and who instead adhere rigorously 
to the term "medical student." Why are they so modest? Their com­
ments suggest that they view themselves as mere students who don't 
yet know much about illness and treatment, and who are insignificant 
foot soldiers just carrying out the orders of real doctors. Does this 
allow them to avoid some sense of responsibility, including having to 
answer patients' questions or having to explain what they are doing 
and why? Do these students imagine that when they obtain their 
medical degrees they will "have all the answers" --and will feel com­
fortable giving these answers to patients? 
I ask them whether the uncertainty they say explains their modest 
self-description is just a manifestation of their novice status, or will 
this uncertainty remain as long as they practice medicine? If so, are 
they trying to come to terms with it by saying "student" (as we are all 
perpetual students of the world if we are lucky)? Or perhaps they are 
trying to deny the ignorance they feel, to make it seem almost laugha-
I. In the 1960s, studies found exactly such fears among physicians, based not on 
logic and rational decision but on "opinion, belief, and conviction, heavily weighted with 
emotional justification." Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients-A Study 0/ Medical Atti­
tudes, 175 J. A.M.A. 1120, 1125 (1961). See generally B. GLASER & A. STRAUSS, 
AWARENESS OF DYING (1965). 
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ble, just as they employ gallows humor among themselves to defuse 
the tension that accompanies their first, fumbling attempts at technical 
procedures that they know they will master in time. 
Perhaps I should not feel a moment's surprise at what I hear from 
these students. The particular mode of self-introduction to patients 
that each student adopts is not merely one for which he or she can give 
some rationale but is one that, when questioned, many admit is com­
fortable precisely because it fulfills the need to avoid those particular 
types of interactions (or feared confrontations) with patients that each 
student finds individually distressing. I should not be surprised by my 
students' answers because The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 2 
makes so abundantly clear that these inclinations lie at the very heart 
of the traditional practice of medicine, as well as the other professions. 
This issue of the Western New England Law Review is devoted to 
that remarkable book. In effect, this journal is a festschrift for the 
book's author, Jay Katz, M.D., the John A. Garver Professor of Law 
and Psychoanalysis at Yale Law School. Professor Katz has written 
on many other topics,3 and has even explored the topic of physician­
patient relations and informed consent in earlier books and articles.4 
But The Silent World is the summary of his thinking on this subject, 
and to celebrate it is thus to celebrate him. Not that all the contribu­
tors to this journal think of themselves as doing that, of course. Yet 
even when viewed by a critic, the book bears the mark of greatness: it 
provokes hard thinking on a difficult issue and forces those who disa­
gree to reexamine their views and defend them in a new fashion. 
Professor Katz's book, which is dedicated to improving commu­
nication between physicians and patients, tells a story of mispercep­
tions and failed communications between the medical profession and 
the larger society. In particular, it finds the manifestations of society's 
views in the apparently sweeping but actually very timid judicial opin­
ions on "informed consent." For example, even when they most 
boldly declare the obligation of physicians to enter into candid discus­
sions and mutual decisionmaking with patients, judges, in Professor 
2. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter 
KATZ]. 
3. See, e.g., his three pioneering casebooks, J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY 
AND THE LAW (1965); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, 
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967); J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 
(1972). 
, 4. See, e.g., J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES 
WHAT? 79-115 (1974); Katz, Disclosure and Consent: In Search of Their Roots, in GENET­
ICS AND THE LAW II 121 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980); Katz, Informed Consent­
A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977). 
4 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9: I 
Katz's view, so misunderstand the training and traditions of the medi­
cal profession that their rulings are self-defeating. 5 Professor Katz 
would probably concur with Lord Scarman's observation that "Can­
terbury propositions reflect a legal truth which too much judicial reli­
ance on medical judgment tends to obscure."6 
What is so valuable about The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient, 
however, is that it goes far beyond merely cataloguing and criticizing 
the judicial opinions. Instead, Professor Katz sets out to understand 
the difficulties that stand in the way of communication and mutual 
decisionmaking in the physician-patient relationship; he then presents 
a strong moral and practical argument in favor of overcoming this 
silence and the lack of true trust that it breeds. As a psychoanalyst, he 
draws on a wide range of sources to establish that the phenomenon at 
issue is not unique to physician-patient interactions but reflects human 
beings' resistance "to get to know themselves and each other better 
through conversation" (p. xiv). Professor Katz also operates as an 
historian and sociologist in this volume; nor is he hesitant to draw on 
literature, such as Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward. 7 In the end, however, 
Professor Katz's role is that of a medical moralist calling upon his 
fellow physicians to overcome their fears of revealing their doubts and 
uncertainties, and to set aside their misguided notions of benevolence. 
By respecting patients' capacity for self-determination, physicians will 
find their relationships with patients more genuinely human, more 
t:motionally satisfying, and more ethically justifiable. 8 
5. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury, 
Judge Robinson held that physicians need only disclose what would be material to the 
average, reasonable patient because this is a standard that physicians are equipped to apply, 
on account of their medical training and experience. Id. at 786-87. Not only does this 
"reasonable patient" standard vitiate any notion, for which Canterbury supposedly stands, 
that the law protects the individual and subjective wishes of people about their own medical 
tare, but it also rests on the misconception that medical training provides physicians with 
an empirical basis for knowing what the average person wants to know about his or her 
treatment. The court's deference to medical standards here is particularly ironic, as Profes­
sor Katz argues, KATZ, supra note 2, at 77-78, because Judge Robinson had earlier held 
that the information to be disclosed to patients could not be left to medical standards be­
cause it is doubtful that there is any true custom, any "professional consensus on communi­
cation of option and risk information to patients...." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783. 
6. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480, 
494. 
7. A. I. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD (1969). 
8. The ethical justification of the position taken by Katz is explored further in R. 
FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986), 
which develops the philosophical aspects of the subject with great care. In particular, 
Professors Faden and Beauchamp develop two senses of informed consent; the first, "au­
tonomous authorization," corresponds closely to what Professor Katz sees as the outcome 
of the communicative process he recommends, while Sense2 informed consent corresponds 
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Professor Katz so persuasively builds the case that silence has 
been a cornerstone of medical practice since ancient times that he may 
seem unlikely to convince those to whom his argument is most cen­
trally addressed. Yet perhaps there is some reason for hope. 
First, biomedical advances in recent years not only equip physi­
cians with formidable tools for attacking disease and disability, they 
also provide physicians with an enormous amount of reliable informa­
tion; unlike their predecessors in earlier centuries, practitioners today 
have something besides puzzlement, ignorance, and misconceptions to 
share with their patients. Of course, the greater powers of medicine 
also create a greater range of alternative treatments-and ultimately 
greater scope for divergence between the wishes or interests of patient 
and physician. 
Second, despite Professor Katz's justifiable scorn for the judges' 
unwillingness to craft legal rules that would give real effect to the 
grand principles they proclaim, physicians seem to have listened to­
and been affected by-the judicial opinions as well as other writings of 
physicians and bioethicists that defend and elaborate upon the princi­
ples. However uncomfortable they may be with the obligation, and 
however much they may misunderstand and sometimes ridicule the 
legal requirement, physicians believe themselves to be under a moral 
and legal obligation to obtain their patients' informed consent to treat­
ment. 9 Granted that for many of them this obligation is seen in fairly 
mechanical terms-such that these physicians equate "informed con­
sent" with the "consent form." It is not unusual to hear a physician 
ask whether someone has "consented the patient," which probably ac­
curately conveys the speaker's view that consent is something that is 
done to a patient rather than a process in which both physician and 
patient take part. 
Nonetheless, as far as this may fall from any true notion of con­
sent, it indicates at least a recognition that someone other than physi­
cians has a stake in medical decisions and that society expects 
physicians to bring patients into the decisionmaking process. This 
idea may hardly seem startling, but as anyone who has been teaching 
medical students for several decades can testify, it represents an amaz­
ing evolution in their professed beliefs on the subject of patient con-
to the rules for consent established by the law, which often departs from Sensei' See id. at 
277-87. 
9. See, e.g., I PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS 
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE 
DECISIONS 70-111 (1982) (reporting results of national study of physicians' attitudes to­
ward informed consent). 
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sent. Therefore, the question becomes: what model of the physician­
patient relationship will the profession adopt? If we are fortunate, it 
will be Jay Katz's. 
As the readers of this symposium will discover, Professor Katz's 
theory is rich and provocative. Yet his central tenet can be stated 
fairly simply: it is that, for both ethical and practical reasons, the phy­
sician-patient relationship must be a mutual one involving both parties 
as active and respected participants. This is possible only through bi­
lateral conversation in which both persons explore their expectations 
as well as their fears, and their knowledge as well as their uncertain­
ties. Ultimately, patients will have the final say about their treatment, 
but patients' decisions can only be "informed" if physicians take seri­
ously the need for conversation and not merely ritual "disclosures." 
Although the book focuses more on the need for reform of physicians' 
attitudes and behavior-rather than supplying a "how to" guide for 
patients-in Professor Katz's model, obligations do not rest solely 
with physicians. Rather, he grounds respect for self-determination not 
merely on the external component of choice but also on an internal 
component, reflection, which is part of the mutual obligation of both 
parties. 
Professor Katz is very aware of the forces, both personal and pro­
fessional, that make his vision of informed consent seem utopian. In­
deed, he sees the pattern as age-old, a conclusion he backs up with 
sources from the dawn of medicine to the present day (pp. 1-47).\0 
Nevertheless, Professor Katz attempts to persuade physicians that if 
they tear down the wall of silence that separates them from their pa­
tients they will not only better respect their patients' rights but will 
derive greater rewards from the enriched human relationship. The au­
thors in this collection explore and take issue with this thesis and its 
application in a variety of settings. 
I. PATERNALISM: NECESSARY EVIL, OR JUST NECESSARY? 
Given the tocsin sounded by Professor Katz, it is fitting that the 
10. Katz characterizes as ineffectual exceptions to this rule the writings of various 
physicians and scholars over many centuries who argued for greater disclosure by physi­
cians and respect for the wishes of patients; other commentators have taken the view that 
these sources indicate a divided tradition in medicine, with some authorities favoring the 
sort of relationship that Katz envisions. See, e.g., Pemick, The Patient's Role in Medical 
Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in 3 PRESI­
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI­
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS I (1982) 
(truth-telling and consent-seeking have long been part of an indigenous tradition in 
medicine, based on their beneficial effects on health). 
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first essay in this collection takes sharp issue with both his diagnosis 
and his prescription. II Thomas P. Duffy, a professor of medicine at 
Professor Katz's own institution, faults The Silent World of Doctor 
and Patient for its too heavy concentration on the actions of surgeons, 
ignoring the path that leads the patient to the "villain-surgeon,"12 a 
path on which Doctor Duffy identifies the family physician as the pa­
tient's guide. Doctor Duffy acknowledges that "lapses [exist] in the 
system,"13 but he laments that Professor Katz's emphasis on auton­
omy will further isolate patients, leaving them more vulnerable. Be­
cause illness already renders patients vulnerable, they are better served 
by a profession dedicated to paternalism than to autonomy. 
Thus, the heart of the disagreement between Duffy and Katz is 
that the former believes that patients will do best to rely on "a trust­
worthy Diogenes"14 to lead them through the health care maze. Duffy 
takes trust to be the norm-actual and ideal-of the physician-patient 
relationship while Katz believes that trust must rest on truth and mu­
tual assent and not on patients' obedience and compliance. Duffy 
agrees that conversation is important, but he doubts that physicians 
can usually ac:hieve the degree of knowledge of patients' inner work­
ings that might emerge from years of psychoanalysis. Outside the lat­
ter setting (in which Professor Katz practices), Doctor Duffy suggests, 
medicine possesses sufficient scientific certainty to render Katz's insis­
tence on the disclosure of uncertainty neither realistic nor necessary. 
Turning Professor Katz's description of the fate of an illustrative 
patient he calls Iphigenia Jones to his own purposes, Doctor Duffy 
argues that not all patients are sacrificial victims, nor should physi­
cians-triumphant now in their return from a biomedical Troy-be 
subject to Agamemnon's fate, namely, death at the hands of the law as 
the avenger of wronged patienthood. Doctor Duffy laments what he 
sees as the result: an increasingly adversarial relationship between 
physician and patient. Although he admits that some of this may have 
been brought on by the failure of physicians in some instances to con­
trol "the reign of technology," 15 he thinks patients will derive greater 
protection from "beneficence and altruism" 16 than from "thoroughgo­
11. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
21 (1987). 
12. Id. at 23. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. /d. at 25. 
16. Id. at 26. 
8 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:1 
ing self-determination."17 The reader may then wish to ask: with 
changes in the incentives in the system of delivering and paying for 
health care--especially with expenditure-controls that aim to limit 
"unnecessary" treatment-which prescription is more likely to protect 
patients' interests and well-being? Indeed, is it possible to protect both 
interests and "best interests," or for that matter, in favoring what 
Duffy labels "civil rights," must one necessarily risk well-being? 
The next two essays in this volume further explore the tension 
between paternalism and autonomy. IS Law professor Charles Baron 
examines what Professor Katz himself terms "the need for an excep­
tion to unconditional respect for patient choice" (p. 162). In the face 
of grave consequences from non-treatment and of a serious impair­
ment in a patient's thinking process, Professor Katz finds it justifiable 
to disregard a patient's refusal of treatment. He apparently regards 
unwillingness to give reasons for one's position as the epitome of such 
impairment; it is ethically relevant because this unwillingness to en­
gage in conversation prevents physicians from knowing "whether they 
have explained themselves satisfactorily to their patients" (pp. 162-63) 
and leaves them "uncertain whether [the patients are] confused as 
well" (p. 160). 
As Professor Baron notes, one cannot be fully confident of Profes­
sor Katz's argumentation because he clothes his justifications in a se­
ries of case studies that illustrate the path he believes physicians 
should follow: namely, a frank statement of frustration with the pa­
tient's failure to explain her or his choice, an assurance that the physi­
cian wishes to be guided by the patient's choice, and a willingness to 
expend whatever time is necessary in conversation. 
Professor Baron fears that this conclusion could replace medical 
paternalism (i. e., providing the treatment the doctor thinks is right 
despite the patient's refusal) with "psychiatric paternalism" (i.e., insis­
tence on the patient's obligation to converse with the physician, backed 
by the threat that the failure to provide any explanation of the choice 
will lead to its being overridden). This result would be avoided, how­
ever, if Professor Katz's exemplary conversations with the silent pa­
tients acknowledged the physician's own needs for conversation to 
avoid later feelings of guilt over having failed to fulfill ethical obliga­
17. [d. 
18. Baron, On Knowing One's Chains and Decking Them with Flowers: Limits on 
Patient Autonomy in "The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient," 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
31 (1987); Caplan, Can We Talk? A Review of Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and 
Patient, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43 (1987). 
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tions to help the patient. 19 Professor Baron thus sees greater dedica­
tion to Professor Katz's own goal of mutuality in decisionmaking as 
the natural corrective for what otherwise might be merely paternalism 
in a new guise. 
A less accepting view of Katz's thesis emerges from the next es­
say, by Arthur Caplan, Assistant Director of the Hastings Center, who 
believes that the mutual obligation to converse actually "puts the man­
tle of authority squarely back on the physician's shoulders"20 because 
many patients are reluctant to participate in the informed consent pro­
cess and, yet in Katz's model, would be forced by physicians to do so. 
Shades of paternalism indeed! ' 
Caplan worries that other forces in the health care system may 
make true communication even more difficult in the coming years. He 
does not totally despair, however, but recommends changes in medical 
education and even admissions standards, to improve physicians' 
skills. He suggests, too, that communication may be enhanced by the 
participation of other, less intimidating figures such as nurses and so­
cial workers in place of physicians. This raises an interesting question 
for those who share Jay Katz's desire to enhance patient autonomy: 
should it be purchased at the price of undermining the idealized rela­
tionship between physician and patient that Katz envisions? 
The adequacy of that ideal is questioned by the final paper in this 
first group.21 Professor Arthur Dyck, the Harvard theologian, agrees 
that conversation leading to mutual understanding is important but 
argues that self-determination not only requires that a patient be 
treated in a morally responsible way but .that the patient be morally 
responsible. Morally responsible choices are made within a context 
that is broader than the physician-patient relationship.22 
In effect, Professor Dyck is taking up one of the themes raised by 
19. As Professor Katz also notes, the provision of reasons by the patient can also 
help to overcome the anger, identified in R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE 
RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979), that can arise when a one party 
in a relationship (in this case, the physician) experiences the other as all powerful, which 
may then lead to abandonment of the patient as the expression of an unconscious wish to 
hurt. 
20. Caplan, supra note 18, at 50. 
21. Dyck, Self-Determination and Moral Responsibility, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53 
(1987). 
22. As Professor Dyck recognizes, Professor Katz did not fall into the trap of confus­
ing "autonomous decisions" with isolated decisions; rather, he simply concentrated on the 
need for changes in the physician-patient relationship and seldom took account of other 
relationships. The reader should be aware that in Professor Katz's usage "autonomy" is a 
psychological concept that refers to people's capacity-about which lawyers and judges as 
well as physicians have many conscious and unconscious doubts-to exercise the right of 
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Doctor Duffy. He points in particular to the relationship of patients to 
their families, and of physicians to these families as well, as a source 
both of support for the patient and of information about the patient. 
As he notes, there is a long tradition in medicine of disclosing informa­
tion to next-of-kin while dissembling to the patient in order to main­
tain hope. Although Professor Katz would not approve of such 
subterfuge, family and friends have just as important a moral role as 
physicians both in promoting autonomous decisionmaking and in pro­
tecting well-being, according to Professor Dyck. 
Finally, Professor Dyck examines the ways in which the law has 
responded when a patient is incapable of participating in the informed 
consent process. He would place limits, as created by the courts and 
legislature, on the choices that family and others could make about 
incompetent patients in order to ensure that choices not be made that 
accelerate death or add to discomfort. 
II. THE LAW AT WORK IN SPECIFIC SETTINGS 
In his essay, Arthur Caplan worries that physicians will feel un­
fairly criticized by Professor Katz's account of their attitudes and be­
havior. What really happens in various medical settings vis-a-vis 
physician-patient communication? How well does it measure up to 
the law's expectations of disclosure and assent, or to Professor Katz's 
call for mutual decisionmaking? 
A pessimistic answer emerges from a description of obstetrical 
care by a law professor with first-hand clinical experience.23 Like Ar­
thur Caplan, Professor Nancy Rhoden sees many of the limitations in 
autonomy arising from patients themselves: most pregnant women 
find rejecting medical recommendations virtually unthinkable. Conse­
quently, obstetricians do not give these women choices, which rein­
forces their passivity. 
Professor Rhoden observed two paradigmatic approaches to ob­
stetrical decisions. Developing the theme of uncertainty that is so cen­
tral to Professor Katz's work, Professor Rhoden describes the first as a 
"maximin strategy,"24 in which uncertainty drives physicians to take 
aggressive steps against the worst possible outcome, regardless of the 
probability of that outcome and of the drawbacks inherent in the pre­
self-determination. that is, the right to make their own decisions without interference. Id. 
at 54. 
23. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems, 9 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 67 (1987). 
24. Id. at 68 (citing Brody & Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics, 12 J. 
FAM. PRAC. 977 (1981». 
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ventative measures themselves. Although the maximin strategy is a 
legitimate response to uncertainty, neither the uncertainty nor the 
choice of the strategy (and its manifestation in forms of obstetrical 
treatment) is usually made clear to patients. 
When a bad outcome for a fetus seems to be materializing, Profes­
sor Rhoden found obstetricians turning to a second strategy, which 
she terms "the only hope"25 approach to decisions: aggressive treat­
ment to give the baby its last chance, even when the chances of success 
are extremely low. The decision to deliver a premature baby by 
Cesarean section illustrates her point, since the operation gives surviv­
ing babies a better chance but also produces a large number of babies 
who would have died during vaginal delivery but who survive with 
serious deficits or who die after weeks or months of intensive care. 
Elaborating further on the concerns raised in The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient, Rhoden finds in the obstetrical setting a great like­
lihood for the divergence between physicians' views and those of their 
patients. For example, physicians "scoff" at women's concerns about 
the process of birth, and yet for many women process and outcome are 
intertwined. Such conflicts increasingly involve other parties, as 
judges are called upon to overrule women's choices that physicians 
believe will endanger the fetus,26 and as legislators and regulators re­
strict the range of choices that can be made about the withdrawal of 
treatment from imperiled newborns.27 Unfortunately, the result of 
such rulings-as Professor Katz would predict-is not only to prevent 
candid and mutually respectful communication but even to drive wo­
men away from the health care system, just as a person needing psy­
chiatric care may avoid seeking it out of fear of being involuntarily 
committed to a mental hospital. 
A second setting in which to test Professor Katz's thesis is pro­
vided by George Annas, health law professor at Boston University's 
schools of medicine and public health.28 In the context of an experi­
mental procedure, such as implantation of an artificial heart, Professor 
Annas argues that more than informed consent is needed: "an in­
dependent judgment must be made that the proposed therapy ... is a 
reasonable experiment from both a scientific and public policy per­
25. Id. at 72-76. 
26. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 
S.E.2d 457 (1981). 
27. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 5101-07 (Supp. II 1984); 45 C.F.R. § 1340 (1985). 
28. Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Consent to the Artificial Heart, 9 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 89 (1987). 
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spective."29 Of course, Annas' argument is not really with Katz but 
with the surgeons who, in his view, have used their patients' consent 
not as a shield that protects the patient but as a sword to sweep aside 
the objections of critics of the experiment. 
The example chosen by Annas does, however, raise questions 
about an issue that The Silent World of Doctor and Patient resolves 
only partially; namely, are there not circumstances in which the risk of 
exploitation of patients is so great that they should be protected from 
their own self-determination? Professor Annas is particularly worried 
that present procedures-from those of the Food and Drug Adminis­
tration down to those of Institutional Review Boards at the institu­
tions where research is conducted-inadequately protect terminally ill 
patients, who are regarded (and may regard themselves) as having 
"nothing to lose," a notion that Annas finds dramatically contradicted 
by the actual experience of Barney Clark and his fellow recipients of 
the Jarvik-7 heart. 
Another setting that involves decisions about critically ill patients 
is examined in Professor Sandra Johnson's article on legislation in sup­
port of "living wills."30 Although supported as a means of protecting 
patients' choices about the extent to which they wish the moment of 
death delayed by medical interventions, these statutes have the same 
unfortunate effect as the judicial decisions on informed consent dis­
cussed by Professor Katz. According to Professor Johnson, the laws 
assume sequential rather than mutual control of decisions by physi­
cians and patients; thus they reinforce the long-standing tradition of 
silence in the relationship. 
Applying Professor Katz's observations, Professor Johnson raises 
a host of objections to the so-called living-will statutes. She is con­
cerned both by their failure to reach important categories of decisions, 
such as treatment termination for patients who were never competent 
to express a choice, and by their success in reaching many other cate­
gories, into which the views of the majority about the extent of care 
may be injected, even when these views differ from those of individual 
patients. Further, the laws' assumption of an identity of interests be­
tween physician and patient seems a doubtful foundation for "protect­
ing individual control over medical treatment decisionmaking,"31 10 
Johnson's view. 
29. Id. at 90 (emphasis in original). 
30. Johnson, Sequential Domination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 113 (1987). 
31. Id. at 128. 
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If Professor Johnson is correct that even when a living will ap­
pears to preserve individual control it may actually dis serve the indi­
vidual, because it represents an easier path-and one more likely to 
result in the refusal of treatment-than the route of real conversation 
that Katz recommends, then the increasing emphasis on patients exe­
cuting "advance directives" such as living wills and durable powers of 
attorney32 would be something to lament. Yet, just as the existence of 
informed consent requirements can be the spur for a true process of 
discussion and decision, so the filling out of a directive can be the spur 
for genuine conversation about a patient's goals and fears among pa­
tient, physician, family, and anyone else who will be called upon to act 
as a surrogate decisionmaker should the patient become incompetent. 
Such a process could, of conrse, have valuable benefits for the quality 
of decisionmaking even while the patient is still competent. Yet, as 
Jay Katz would certainly agree, such a fortunate result is by no means 
guaranteed by the existence of living-will and durable power of attor­
ney statutes, nor even by the use of the documents to which such stat­
utes give legal sanction. 
Professor Johnson believes that lawyers are well situated to en­
courage good use of advance directives; rather than relying on forms, 
they can draw up individual documents tailored to the client's circum­
stances and can urge the client to talk to physician and family about 
the subject. In his contribution to this volume, Professor Mark Spie­
gel shifts the spotlight to lawyers themselves as the objects-rather 
than the creators--of the requirement of informed consent. 33 Ex­
tending the general analysis of this. issue that he undertook in a pio­
neering article nearly a decade ago,34 Professor Spiegel asks whether 
the doctrine of informed consent is needed in the law if, as some con­
tend, "large corporate clients exercise control over their lawyers rather 
than vice versa."35 
Besides criticizing the weakness of the data on which proponents 
of the corporate-control thesis rest their case, Professor Spiegel chal­
lenges the underlying proposition that attorneys for corporations lack 
autonomy in their relationships with their clients. Drawing on Katz's 
32. See, e.g., N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 48, 122-23 
(1987); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS­
TAINING TREATMENT 136-53 (1983). 
33. Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering 
and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139 (1987). 
34. Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal 
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979). 
35. Spiegel, supra note 33, at 140. 
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analysis-particularly his emphasis on the need to recognize the po­
tential for divergence between professional and client on means even 
when they agree on a common goal-Spiegel argues that "means can 
either determine ends or be ends in and ofthemselves."36 Particularly 
significant is the ability of a lawyer-through what Spiegel terms inter­
mediate forms of influence-to turn the issue of "what is right?" into 
"what can be done, technically?"37 Spiegel admits that the greater re­
liance on in-house counsel may reduce the need for informed consent 
because the corporation thereby becomes an informed consumer of 
legal services. Yet that would seem simply to shift the focus of in­
quiry: to the extent that in-house counsel are still professionals, what 
standards of disclosure and consent should govern the decisionmaking 
process in which they and their client/employers engage? 
Assuming that informed consent has a role in the lawyer-client 
relationship,38 what special problems arise when this doctrine-devel­
oped as a means of social control over the actions of physicians-is 
applied to lawyers? Professor Spiegel is troubled by the notion that 
informed consent would have the effect of linking lawyers more closely 
to the actions of their clients, which actions often can have adverse 
effects on third parties (unlike most medical treatment decisions, in 
Spiegel's view). 
The harm envisioned by Spiegel could arise if lawyers feel im­
pelled to honor their clients' autonomy by implementing the clients' 
wishes even when doing so violates other ethical precepts. Yet if in­
formed consent is interpreted as Professor Katz urges, it could lead to 
greater conversation between lawyer and client that could clarify the 
client's true intent, which may be less objectionable than the lawyer 
assumed. 
The problems caused by extending informed consent to lawyering 
would be exacerbated if the requirement of honoring clients' wishes is 
understood to relieve lawyers of moral responsibility for the choices 
made. The irony here is that this argument against informed consent 
is the converse of that raised by physicians. The latter claim that in­
36. Id. at 143. 
37. Spiegel suggests the need for study of this intermediate form ofinftuence on deci­
sions. Id. at 144 n.24. Such an examination could be broadened to include not merely the 
comparable phenomenon in medicine but the ways that "cans" are translated into "musts" 
in society generally. See D. CALLAHAN, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL 253-69 (1973). 
38. As Professor Spiegel points out, even were one to conclude that corporate clients 
do not need the protection provided by informed consent requirements, it does not follow 
that it is unnecessary to apply informed consent to the legal profession because individual 
clients are likely to stand in relationship to their attorneys much the way individual pa­
tients do toward their physicians. Spiegel, supra note 33, at 145. 
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formed consent rules force them to involve patients in decisions and 
follow patients' directions even when the choices patients make will 
serve the patients' interests less well than would decisions made on 
their behalf by their physicians. The premise is that physicians should 
be trusted not only because they are more knowledgeable and dispas­
sionate but because they are ethically required to put patients' interests 
above all others. Conversely, the objection to informed consent that 
concerns Spiegel is that the doctrine will cause lawyers to give up on 
their present role as moderators of their clients' harmful, selfish behav­
ior, to the detriment of third parties or general societal interests. 
In Professor Spiegel's view the problem is actually that lawyers 
too seldom assume the role of moral agents vis-a.-vis their clients' ac­
tions. A dialogue of the type recommended by Professor Katz for 
physicians and patients would thus be a good prescription for lawyers 
and clients as well. It would reinforce the reality that both parties are 
jointly involved in decisionmaking and bear responsibility for the 
choices made-neither lawyers claiming to be neutral professionals 
nor clients relying on lawyers to preempt decisions in order to achieve 
an "ethical" outcome that had never been broached, much less 
thrashed out, with the client. Though it may not be possible simply to 
apply doctor-rules to the practice of law, The Silent World of Doctor 
and Patient contains ideas that reverberate for lawyers as well as for 
physicians. 
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
Returning to some of the themes discussed by Professors Dyck 
and Johnson, the presiding judge and first assistant register of a Mas­
sachusetts probate and family court explore the relationship between 
Professor Katz's book and the obstacles they have seen in judicial pro­
ceedings that stand in the way of the treatment needs of incompetent 
patients.39 Because of the Commonwealth's somewhat unusual insis­
tence on the primacy of judicial control of treatment decisions for in­
competents,40 the court-appointed guardian ad litem and counsel for 
the incompetent, and then the judge her or himself, are placed in a role 
with the physician comparable to that of competent patients deciding 
about their own treatment. This insistence upon the involvement of a 
disinterested judge seems consistent with Professor Katz's concern 
39. Dunphy & Cross, Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: The Massa­
chusetts Substituted Judgment Model, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 153 (1987). 
40. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
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that physicians by themselves cannot be counted on to make decisions 
in their patients' true interests. But from another angle, it merely 
shifts the locus of concern: can judges be counted on to play the role of 
an engaged patient and not to retreat from an active conversation with 
the physicians and other treaters? 
Judge Dunphy and Mr. Cross find in trial judges a tendency to 
defer to the medical personnel when called upon to make a "substi­
tuted judgment" for an incapacitated patient. Worse yet, communica­
tion may be so unclear that each participant may think that another is 
actually taking responsibility for the decision.41 Nonetheless, they be­
lieve that guidelines established by the courts for the trial judge, 
guardian, and counsel can ensure that a complete picture of each case 
emerges from the adversarial proceedings in the courtroom. 
Especially if the court proceedings are going to turn into the sort 
of give-and-take discussion imagined by Professor Katz, they will cer­
tainly demand a good deal of judicial time and social resources-and 
the Dunphy-Cross article argues for the allocation of additional per­
sonnel and funds. Concern over the wisdom of such allocation-is the 
result in terms of improved decisionmaking worth the extra cost?-is 
comparable to the doubts Katz found in physicians concerning the 
burdens created by informed consent requirements. The authors do 
not answer this question directly, but they support penalties (in licen­
sure or malpractice settings) for physicians who attempt to evade the 
requirements of prior judicial review. 
At the opposite extreme from enforced medical deference to the 
legal system lies the British approach to physician-patient relations, as 
portrayed in Professor Frances Miller's contribution to this sympo­
sium.42 In her view, the deference to medical decisionmaking in Eng­
lish law rests on two factors. First are the deeply ingrained class (and 
meritocratic) distinctions which produce the judiciary's solicitude for 
its sister profession of medicine. Second, the organization of medical 
care-in which general practitioners are expected to act as gatekeepers 
for the National Health System-would be made much more difficult 
if the gatekeepers had to inform their patients fully about possible op­
tions for treatment and then attempt to implement their patients' 
choices. 
This is not to say, however, that British practitioners are under 
41. Dunphy and Cross quote the transcript in the Saikewicz case itself, Dunphy & 
Cross, supra note 39, at 159-60, which Professor Robert Burt used to illustrate just such 
confusion. See R. BURT, supra note 9, at 155-57. 
42. Miller, Informed Consent for the Man on the Clapham Omnibus: An English 
Cure for "An American Disease"?, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 169 (1987). 
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no obligation to disclose; merely that their duty does not encompass 
the patient-based standard of The Silent World of Doctor and Pa­
tient.43 The courts not only accepted the view that informed consent 
rules would impose excessive burdens on physicians but also opined 
that they would undermine trust. This view is so diametrically op­
posed to Professor Katz's that the impetus for the changes he recom­
mends will in England have to come from patients or medical leaders 
rather than from the law. 
A refreshing counterpoint to the paternalism of the British rul­
ings is offered by Chief Justice John B. Doolin's opinion for the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Scott v. Bradford,44 excerpts from 
which provide the concluding entry in this section of the symposium. 
Professor Katz praised Scott as the "one exception" (p. 76) to the 
"reasonable patient" limitation placed on disclosure by courts that 
. adopted a patient-based rather than a physician-based standard.45 
It is not hard to understand the motivation for this outcome; for it 
might seem harsh to judge the materiality of information by "the 
patient's need," since a physician "obviously cannot be required to 
know the inner workings of his patient's mind." [Waltz & 
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. V.L. REV. 628, 
639 (1970).] But an objective standard shares the basic fault of the 
"medical community" standard which these courts were aban­
doning. Adherence to what a group in the lay community believes 
to be "reasonable" may rob the patient of "the undisputed right ... 
to receive information which will enable him to make a choice" 
[Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.1. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972)] 
as surely as will adherence to a judgment of the medical 
community . 
. . . Since the purpose of requiring informed consent is to allow 
43. It may surprise Americans to find that Lord Diplock, in the House of Lords 
decision in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985]2 W.L.R. 480, 
actually claimed an elite position for judges (and perhaps others who have undergone the 
rigors of training and experience at the Bar?): their right to be fully informed about and 
involved in their medical care must be protected even though physicians were under no 
such obligation toward ordinary Englishwomen and men. See id. at 500. In Blyth v. 
Bloomsbury Health Auth. & Another, (May 24, '1985) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file), 
the court took a similar view regarding a physician's obligation to give complete informa­
tion about drug side-effects in response to direct inquiries from a plaintiff "with nursing 
qualifications who could be trusted not to act irrationally because of what she was told." 
Id. 
44. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). 
45. McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982), also adopted a subjec­
tive standard, but the decision was of little importance since it enunciated a rule applicable 
to the operation performed in 1975, while beginning in 1976, North Carolina by statute 
required that an objective standard be applied. 
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patient-subjects to participate in the course of therapy and research 
as informed decision makers, concern should focus on whether the 
patient-subject in question understood what the physician-investiga­
tor was proposing to do as compared with other ways of proceeding. 
To eliminate the "subjective" elements that relate to the particular 
patient-subject (which lead him, for example, not to be "reason­
able" in deciding about certain kinds of interventions) is to make 
the informed consent doctrine an engine of depersonalization rather 
than personalization.46 
IV. THE WIDER PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNICATION 
In the final contribution to this symposium, Martha Minow of the 
Harvard Law School extends Jay Katz's examination of the silence 
between physicians and patients into other relationships-parent­
child, professional-client, stranger-stranger, and state-individua1.47 In 
all of these settings, she sees the possibility for challenging abuses of 
power through communication. 
As Professor Minow recognizes, there are times-when a sexually 
active adolescent wants birth control devices, for example-when re­
quiring conversation may result in immediate harm rather than 
greater equality and shared decisionmaking. Further, civil or criminal 
actions to enforce disclosure and consent rules risk destroying some 
very delicate relationships. But if the participants are willing to en­
gage in communication in the fashion recommended by Professor 
Katz, sharing uncertainties and recognizing mutuality, Professor Mi­
now suggests that patterns of dominance and dependency-with all 
their potential for misunderstanding, disappointment, and harm-can 
be overcome. 
Some of Professor Minow's examples may seem to extend Profes­
sor Katz's thesis beyond its limits,48 but it is actually a compliment to 
The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient that all of the contributors to 
this volume were inspired to attempt just such intellectual stretching. 
46. Capron, In/ormed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 340,408-09 (1974). 
47. Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1987). 
48. Labeling the relationship between a manufacturer and a consumer a stranger­
stranger relationship, Professor Minow suggests that the difficulties in communication once 
insulated manufacturers from liability ("absence of privity"); now a doctrine of strict liabil­
ity applies to injuries caused by product defects. Playing on words, Professor Minow ar­
gues that strict liability "communicates to the producer the risk of injury to the buyer." Id. 
at 203. Doubtless strict liability encourages producers to internalize the costs of injuries 
into their calculations but this "communication" looks remarkably different from the dia­
logue that Professor Katz describes in his book. 
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Through his careful look at the history and norms of one particular 
profession, Professor Katz has provided insights that illuminate other 
activities and the relationships on which they are built, even when his 
observations about physicians and patients cannot be extended exactly 
to those other relationships. Similarly, his meticulous dissection of the 
judicial opinions on informed consent not only increases clarity in this 
area of the law but also shows how the law sometimes falls short of its 
stated aspirations, and why. 
With this book, Jay Katz has begun a dialogue about the harmful 
effects of reticence in a relationship that is important in all our lives. 
The contributors to this symposium have joined this dialogue, in 
which the editors of the Western New England Law Review and I now 
invite you to participate. 
